Bushehr nuclear power plant

Part of the Global Nuclear Power Tracker, a Global Energy Monitor project.

Report an error

Bushehr nuclear power plant is an operating nuclear power plant in Bushehr suburb village, Bushehr County, Bushehr Province, Iran.

Project Details

Table 1: Unit-level project details for Bushehr nuclear power plant

Unit name	Status	Commissioning year	Nameplate capacity	Reactor type	Model	Owner	Operator
1	Operating	2013	1000 MW	Pressurized water reactor	VVER V-446	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran [100%]	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran
2	Construction	2028 (planned)	1057 MW	Pressurized water reactor	V-528 VVER-1000 AES-92 GIII+	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran [100%]	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran
3	Pre-construction	2026 (planned)	1057 MW	Pressurized water reactor	VVER V-528	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran [100%]	Nuclear Power Production And Development CO Of Iran

Table 2: Additional unit-level timeline details for Bushehr nuclear power plant

Unit name	Construction start	First criticality (more info)	First grid connection	Commercial operation
1	May 1, 1975	May 8, 2011	September 3, 2011	September 23, 2013
2	September 27, 2019	–	–	2028
3	–	–	–	2026

Table 3: Additional unit-level capacity details for Bushehr nuclear power plant

(Read more about nuclear capacity definitions.)

Unit name	Reference net capacity	Design net capacity	Thermal capacity
1	915 MW	915 MW	3000 MWt
2	974 MW	974 MW	3012 MWt
3	–	915 MW	3000 MWt

Location

Table 4: Unit-level location details for Bushehr nuclear power plant

Unit name	Location	Coordinates (WGS 84)
1	Bushehr suburb village, Bushehr County, Bushehr Province, Iran	28.82962, 50.88601 (exact)
2	Bushehr suburb village, Bushehr County, Bushehr Province, Iran	28.82962, 50.88601 (exact)
3	Bushehr suburb village, Bushehr County, Bushehr Province, Iran	28.82962, 50.88601 (exact)

The map below shows the exact location of the nuclear power plant:

Loading map...

{"type":"SATELLITE","minzoom":false,"maxzoom":false,"types":["ROADMAP","SATELLITE","HYBRID","TERRAIN"],"mappingservice":"googlemaps3","width":"600px","height":"500px","centre":false,"title":"","label":"","icon":"","lines":[],"polygons":[],"circles":[],"rectangles":[],"copycoords":false,"static":false,"visitedicon":"","wmsoverlay":false,"zoom":16,"layers":[],"controls":["pan","zoom","type","scale","streetview","rotate"],"zoomstyle":"DEFAULT","typestyle":"DEFAULT","autoinfowindows":false,"resizable":false,"kmlrezoom":false,"poi":true,"cluster":false,"clustergridsize":60,"clustermaxzoom":20,"clusterzoomonclick":true,"clusteraveragecenter":true,"clusterminsize":2,"imageoverlays":[],"kml":[],"gkml":[],"searchmarkers":"","fullscreen":false,"scrollwheelzoom":false,"locations":[{"text":"","title":"","link":"","lat":28.82962,"lon":50.88601,"icon":"","inlineLabel":"Units 1, 2, 3\n"}]}

General Overview

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) is Iran’s first nuclear power plant. The power plant began construction in 1975, and Phase 1 began operation in 2013. Phase 2 of the power plant is anticipated to begin operation in 2024.

Background and Context

Iran’s nuclear power program was first established through partnership between the United States and Iran in 1953, with the creation of the Atoms for Peace program. This program was intended to provide assistance for developing countries to use nuclear power for energy and energy independence, as well as to establish allyship during the Cold War. At this time, the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in order to promote nuclear power development in Iran. AEOI continues to have a leading role in the regulation of nuclear power, and particularly in the Bushehr nuclear plant.

The Bushehr nuclear plant has gone through several iterations for the design and implementation of the site. In 1974, construction for the nuclear plant was implemented largely by Kraftwerk Union AG FRG, a subsidiary of German company Siemens AG. At the lead-up to the Iranian Revolution in 1977, Phase 1 was near completion, and work had begun on Phase 2. However, in 1979 the site was temporarily shut down and payment to Siemens AG was withheld. Completion of the power plant was further postponed with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, and the site experienced damages from air strikes between 1984-1988.

In August 1992, the Iranian and Russian governments signed an agreement in Moscow to build a two phase nuclear power project in Iran, and the Bushehr site was chosen because of the existing equipment provided by Siemens AG. Russia agreed to work with AEOI on incorporating the existing infrastructure, and contracts were signed in January 1995 to begin this work.

Construction proved challenging for Russian contractors. Russian contractor Atomstroyexport - a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned corporation known as Rosatom - adapted its V-392 design to include the V-446 equipment supplied by Siemens AG in 1975. The extent of Atomstroyexport to include Siemens AG’s equipment from 1975 was limited because of the advancement of safety regulations that required the equipment to undergo significant upgrades. The World Nuclear Association adds that local reports estimate that parts for Phase 1 of Bushehr nuclear power plant are 25% German in origin, 40% Russian, and 36% are Iranian-made.

Phase 1

In August 1992, Iranian and Russian governments signed an agreement to build a two phase nuclear power plant in Iran. Russia agreed to facilitate the construction of a new nuclear power plant, however AEOI insisted on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant instead. Russia’s Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) resumed construction of the plant in 1998, with an anticipated completion of 2004. Ultimately, construction was completed in 2011, and the first phase of Bushehr nuclear plant established grid connection in September 2013. As part of the agreement, Minatom supplied over 600 Russian engineers and technicians, as well as provided training in Russia for Iranian engineers.

Agreements set up between Russia and Iran included a 50-50 joint participation in operating Phase 1 for the first year, and this was extended for an additional three years before Russian company Atomstroyexport withdrew its technicians. There is discrepancy in reports about Atomstroyexport technicians' most recent involvement in operating the reactors, but it is believed that Russian technicians continue to be involved in some capacity.

Renovations and Delays

Plant construction was taken over by a Russian construction contractor, Atomstroyexport - a subsidiary of Russian state-owned Rosatom - after agreements were made between Russia and Iran. Since construction requirements for nuclear power plants had evolved since the early construction of the site in 1975, the existing parts and plans underwent strict inspection. For instance, the initial planning of the nuclear plant included two desalination plants to be linked to the reactors. However, this was later dropped by Atomstroyexport. Desalination was reintroduced in later design, and Phase 2 will provide potable water to the city of Bushehr once complete.

Major aforementioned political conflicts contributed widely to the delays in construction of Phase 1. Also notable was the increased pressure by Iran’s neighbors to ensure safety regulations of the Bushehr power plant before it was able to come online. The plant was designed to sustain magnitude 8 earthquakes, and Bushehr experienced damage from a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in April 2013, followed by a tremor in May. Iran notified IAEA that no significant damage occurred at Bushehr, however the reactor remained out of use until its September 2013 operation date due to generator problems.

This event led to the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to discuss concerns over the risks of radiation in the region, if Bushehr were to experience damages from future earthquakes. GCC Secretary-General, Abdulatif al-Zayani, urged that the Gulf states develop protocol and jointly plan for future events. While Iran is not a member of the GCC, the government was urged to “ensure its facility complies with international safety standards and join the Convention on Nuclear Safety”, reported Reuters in April 2013.

The Convention of Nuclear Safety was first adopted in 1994 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure high safety levels for operating civil nuclear power plants. Ultimately, Iran is not a party to the convention, and is the only country that operates nuclear power reactors without participation in this agreement. However, IAEA continues to monitor and cooperate with Iran in the safe regulation of Bushehr nuclear power plant. This adherence is led significantly by Iran’s involvement with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

AEOI announced that Phase 1 underwent successful repairs and refueling in June 2020, and that Bushehr was reconnected to the national grid soon after. This work was reported by AEOI to have been performed by Iranian technicians.

Phase 2

Phase 2 of Bushehr nuclear power plant was planned during original construction agreements set out by Iran and German company Siemens AG in 1975. Atomstroyexport, a subsidiary of Russian company Rosatom, took over building and construction as part of agreements made between Iran and Rosatom in 1992, and two additional reactors were included in planning for the Bushehr site. By late 2014, the two parties made amendments to their agreement to include four VVER reactors for Bushehr, and an additional four for a future site. Rosatom was to supply all nuclear fuel, and none of the original construction by German company Siemens AG would be included in the new construction of Phase 2. This exclusion of Siemens AG materials from Phase 2 differs from Phase 1, where original material was  integrated into the new design.

Construction and Delays

Construction on Phase 2 of Bushehr was planned to begin in March 2016, but AEOI delayed this until September due to a disagreement over seismic parameters. The foundation was laid in late 2016, and AEOI hosted an inauguration of Phase 2 construction in September 2016. In attendance of this ceremony was Eshaq Jahangiri Kouhshahi, the first vice president of the Hassan Rouhani government that served from 2013-2021. In AEOI’s announcement succeeding the inauguration, AEOI mentions that the total investment of Phase 2 could be up to 8.5 billion USD, and that “the units will be built in accordance with the IAEA state-of-art safeguard standards” over the course of its anticipated 10 year construction period. Equipment for this phase reportedly includes VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors. Construction for unit 2 of Phase 2 began in March 2017, while excavation work for unit 3 began in January 2021.

Construction of Phase 2 was also reported to have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and a revised construction schedule was established for a 2024 operation year. The Times of Israel reports that AEOI also cited delays in construction were due to “financial problems”, and that discussions with Russian leaders would include the potential investment by Russia in Iran’s nuclear power program. As of January 2023, no decisions on investment in Phase 2 of Bushehr nuclear plant have been reported.

Financing

Financing for Bushehr nuclear power plant comes from Iran’s government, and facilitated through a long standing partnership with Russia and Russian company Rosatom that provides construction contracting through its subsidiary Atomstroyexport.

Opposition

Bushehr nuclear power plant has been the target of international efforts to discourage the development of nuclear power in Iran. For instance, Siemens AG, the original construction contract holder for Phase 1 of Bushehr, “refused to continue the construction in the face of extreme diplomatic pressure from the United States”, after the Iran-Iraq war.

During construction of Bushehr, there were also concerns by Iran and Russia that the Stuxnet worm had infected systems at the plant, causing delays in construction. The Stuxnet worm is a computer virus reportedly developed by Israel with assistance by the United States CIA. The worm infected computers operating Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, causing gas centrifuges to spin too quickly and ultimately break beyond repair. This computer virus was one among many attempts to reportedly “sabotage” equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities.

In April 2013, a 7.7 magnitude earthquake in Iran killed dozens of people months before the Bushehr power plant Phase 1 would ultimately come into operation, in September 2013. While the April 2013 earthquake reportedly did not impact the plant, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) ensured that the plant was equipped to withstand more substantial earthquakes. Iran has experienced significant loss of life and damages from earthquakes in the past, including a 6.6 magnitude earthquake that killed over 25,000 people in 2003. In this context, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Iran is not party to, expressed concern for possible radiation from the Bushehr nuclear plant impacting the safety of the six surrounding nations in the GCC. For instance, cities such as Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi are downwind of Bushehr nuclear plant and would be directly impacted by radiation if Bushehr experienced complications. GCC has urged Iran to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) that is facilitated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This convention was set up in response to the nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. While Iran has not joined the convention, the country has made steps to adhere to IAEA’s safety regulations, as well as their expectations on safe radiation waste management.

In July 2015, Iran reached an accord with several countries, including the United States, China and Russia, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear agreement. JCPOA involves setting restrictions on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Iran agreed not to produce enriched uranium or plutonium that could be used to produce nuclear weapons, as well as allow for the increased involvement of international regulatory systems in the safe maintenance of its nuclear energy programme, including Bushehr nuclear power plant. In return for adherence, JCPOA included agreements to gradually lift sanctions on US and European Union trading with Iran. In 2016, the United States announced that JCPOA was able to facilitate the safe removal of 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium, and the greater involvement of international regulatory systems in Iran’s nuclear power program. In addition, JCPOA included an agreement that Russia receives excess enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for providing nuclear fuel to the Bushehr nuclear plant. As a result of these accomplishments, the United States began lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran that were put in place out of concern for Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. While former President Trump’s withdrawal of the US in JCPOA caused delays in the implementation of the plan, the United States reinstated its involvement in the program in November 2021 under US President Biden.

With the onset of the Ukraine War in 2022, progression of JCPOA negotiations in Vienna were stalled. While the reasons for this delay are not entirely understood, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) believes that sanctions on Russian oil have led to Russia wanting to preserve its relationship with Iran. CFR reports that “Iranian officials are insisting that the cause of the delay is the United States’ unwillingness to lift [nuclear] sanctions”. As of January 2023, signatories of JCPOA had been reported by Bloomberg to have come to an agreement on the lifting of sanctions on Iran - in the form of trade and oil restrictions - in exchange for further limiting Iran’s nuclear program. However, Iran rejected this proposal, and Iran’s response to protesters of the death of Mahsa Amini have caused skepticism in the possibility of further negotiations of this deal. As of January 2023, the role of Russia in Iran’s nuclear program appears to continue, however Russia’s role in Iran’s rejection of the JCPOA agreements is unknown.

Local and international sources reported in October 2022 that an email server belonging to a subsidiary of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) that supports Bushehr nuclear power plant had been hacked. At the same time, an Iranian hacking group called Black Reward  published on Twitter declaring that the group had information and documents pertaining to activity at the Bushehr power plant. This information was reported to also include “atomic development contracts and agreements with domestic and foreign partners”. The Twitter statement ended with a demonstration of support for protesters responding to the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died in custody of Iran’s morality police in September 2022.

Articles and Resources

Additional data

To access additional data, including an interactive map of global nuclear power plants, a downloadable dataset, and summary data, please visit the Global Nuclear Power Tracker on the Global Energy Monitor website.